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Introduction 
 
Carl von Clausewitz is widely regarded as an acute observer and contemporary 
witness of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Yet his own 
experience of French captivity in 1806-1807 – well documented in his letters to 
his fiancée Marie von Brühl – has not been studied in depth. It gives fascinating 
insights not only into Clausewitz’ own evaluation of his time in captivity, but also 
in the inner workings of the broader transformation of war during that period.  
 
Peter Paret states in his seminal intellectual biography of Clausewitz that his 
time in captivity had a great impact on his career and his life. Yet, he only 
devotes six print pages of his biography to that phase of Clausewitz’s life.1 What 
stands out for Paret is ‘the hurt to his [Clausewitz’s] patriotism’ induced by the 
experience of defeat and captivity and his ensuing identification with the 
Prussian state.2 In contrast to Paret, Donald Stoker in his Clausewitz biography 
recognises that the reference point of Clausewitz patriotism during his time in 
captivity was not necessarily the Prussian state, but the German nation.3 Yet 
Stoker devotes hardly any more pages than Paret to exploring the tension 
between these two reference points.  
 
More recently, two biographies have given more attention to Clausewitz’s time in 
captivity. Vanya Bellinger covers it at length in her biography of Marie von 
Clausewitz. Bellinger emphasises the degree to which the correspondence 
between Carl and Marie was subject to French surveillance.4 She concludes that 
‘Unable to talk openly about politics, the two lovers used the time and their 
letters to share their intimate memories, dreams, and wishes, and to reveal to 
one another their aspirations.’5 While Bellinger’s assertion about French 
surveillance is correct, this still did not prevent Carl from conveying to Marie his 
impressions about the French – and, by extension, about the German – national 
characters, a deeply political subject. Bruno Colson’s Clausewitz biography 
provides the most extensive and detailed coverage of Clausewitz’s time in 
captivity. Colson devotes extensive attention to Clausewitz’ ‘educational journey’ 
to France and later Switzerland. In particular, he highlights that in his writings 
                                                        
1 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, his Theories, and his Times 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 126-131. 
2 Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 127-128. Cf. Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A 
Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), 83-95, which does not explore this 
issue either. 
3 Donald Stoker, Clausewitz: His Life and Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 67. 
4 Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the Making 
of On War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 76. 
5 Bellinger, Marie von Clausewitz, 78. 
from captivity, Clausewitz was at pain to debunk the dominant opinion according 
to which the French, and in particular the Napoleonic, system of war had made 
the French invincible.6  His work is an indispensable source for analysing 
Clausewitz’s writings from 1806-07. This article seeks to push Colson’s line of 
thought further by highlighting the extent to which Clausewitz’ construction of 
the French national character went hand in glove with an exploration of the 
‘German’ national character, which was for the time of his captivity, the main 
reference point of Clausewitz’ patriotism. 
 
Clausewitz’ experience in French captivity epitomizes the uneven and 
incomplete transformation from ancien régime practices of captivity in war 
towards a prisoner of war regime that reflected the political demands and 
sensitivities emerging from the nationalization of war. The French Revolution 
attempted to discontinue ancien régime practices, such as the exchange of 
prisoners and the release of officers on parole. Yet Clausewitz, in his role as 
adjutant to Prince August, enjoyed aristocratic privileges in captivity that closely 
mirrored these old regime traditions. Their status, however, had become 
inevitably politicized by a number of decrees that the French National 
Convention had adopted during the revolution. Clausewitz’s personal experience, 
though largely structured by old regime practices, reflected this politicization to 
the extent that it threw up questions of political identity – that of the foe, France, 
as well as that of Clausewitz’s own side, which he, for the time of his captivity, 
constructed as ‘German’ rather than ‘Prussian’.  
 
While Clausewitz was distraught at having to accompany prince August to 
France after both had been taken captive in the aftermath of the twin battles of 
Jena and Auerstedt in October 1806, he used the time of his captivity to study the 
enemy – France – at close quarters. He eagerly studied French culture and 
architecture. His letters to Marie betray a strong anti-French patriotism. 
However, one would be mistaken to assume that his criticism of France was 
aimed at the revolutionary transformation of French society and government. On 
the contrary, Clausewitz characterized the France he encountered in 1806-1807 
as the true bastion of ancien régime policies and the French people as culturally 
backward.  
 
The company of Prince August did nothing to lift Clausewitz’ spirits. Having 
grown up at the Prussian court, August had been profoundly ‘Frenchified’ in his 
education and his manners. Clausewitz equated the negative traits of his 
companion with what he regarded as the deficiencies of the French national 
character. The France that Clausewitz encountered epitomized the roots of a 
much wider late aristocratic malaise and cultural decadence that had gripped 
                                                        
6 Bruno Colson, Clausewitz (Paris: Perrin: 2016), 85-86. 
Europe before the French Revolution. Clausewitz’ assessment was that the 
French Revolution had not overcome this late aristocratic malaise, and that the 
French were unable to shake off their decadent national character. His 
observations during his time in captivity would feature prominently in musings 
about the differences in the French and the German ‘national characters’. While 
the French had dabbled in republicanism, they were neither culturally nor 
mentally suited to it; hence the French Revolution had not had a lasting societal 
impact. Clausewitz contrasted this with the German national character and 
concluded that it was the Germans who were culturally and mentally geared to a 
republican political system.7   
 
In sum, Clausewitz’ experience of French captivity led him to question and to 
reverse the political characteristics traditionally ascribed to France 
(=revolutionary) and Prussia (=absolutist). This gave him the hope that, in spite 
of its crushing defeat in October 1806, Prussia could regenerate itself and 
eventually prevail against Napoleonic France. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section will survey 
the background of policies and practices surrounding captivity in war and its 
transformation during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The third 
part of the paper introduces Clausewitz’s background and his writings up to 
1806. The fourth section is devoted to his letters from captivity, which will be 
evaluated in the fifth part of the paper. The conclusion will summarise the 
arguments and findings and will point to future avenues of research.  
 
 
Captivity in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
 
The fate of prisoners in early modern European warfare consisted of one of four 
options: immediate release from the battlefield, release for ransom or in 
exchange for prisoners from one’s own side, release on parole, or impressment 
into the captor’s armed forces.8 Sieges, which formed an important aspect of war 
in early modern Europe, and rebellions, did not partake of this repertoire of 
prisoner treatment, and survivors often met a much grimmer fate. 
 
                                                        
7 Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Die Deutschen und die Franzosen’, in Hans Rothfels (ed.) 
Politische Schriften und Briefe (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922), 46. However, 
Clausewitz also noted that Prussia’s geopolitical situation meant that it could ill 
afford a political system based on managed dissent.  
8 Sibylle Scheipers, ‘The Status and Protections of Prisoners of War and 
Detainees’, Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds), The Changing Character of 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 396. 
Release from the battlefield happened in situations when one or more of the 
warring parties were unable to take prisoners. Prisoner exchanges were more 
desirable when circumstances allowed for initial captivity. With the evolution of 
absolutist states in seventeenth century Europe a cartel system developed to 
organize the practice of exchange for ransom or man-for-man.9 Release on parole 
was an option that was only open to officers. They were released to their home 
country provided that they gave their word of honour (parole d’honneur) not to 
return to the fight for the duration of the conflict. Where this was not feasible, 
officers ‘enjoyed relatively comfortable conditions … in some form of house 
arrest’. 10 Finally, impressment into the captor’s armed forces was a common 
practice for rank and file soldiers, whom early modern rulers frequently viewed 
as mercenaries lacking political loyalty and hence as an asset that would fight 
just as well or as badly on one’s own side. If successful, impressment had the 
obvious advantage of simultaneously boosting one’s own manpower resources 
while depriving the enemy without having to create burdensome administrative 
structures such as the ones that were required for exchanges. However, as 
Frederick II learnt after he had impressed 18,000 Saxon soldiers into the 
Prussian army in 1756, soldiers’ loyalties were a force that could not be 
discarded: within five months, the majority of them had deserted and had 
formed a contingent of the French army.11  
 
Profound changes to these established practices came about in the course of the 
French Revolutionary Wars. On 26 May 1794, the French National Convention 
issued a ‘no quarter’ decree towards British, Hanoverian, Hessian and Spanish 
captives. The rationale behind this decree was that the British and their allies 
were singled out as particularly ‘traitorous’ enemies of the French Revolution, as 
their comparatively more liberal political system made their enmity to 
revolutionary France look like an especially poignant betrayal. The decree was 
never implemented on the battlefield as the ‘white’ veteran elements of the 
French Revolutionary army continued to apply ancien régime practices towards 
captives.12 But its substance was revolutionary to the extent that, for the first 
time in the history of war, prisoners were differentiated along the lines of (quasi-
) nationality. What ensued was a struggle between old and new, between the 
politicization of the prisoner issue emerging from revolutionary Paris and the 
reassertion of professionalism among the officer corps, which became even more 
pronounced in the Napoleonic era. Officers attempted to negotiate formal 
                                                        
9 Peter Wilson, ‘Prisoners in Early Modern European Warfare’, Sibylle Scheipers 
(ed) Prisoners in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 49. 
10 Ibid., 53. 
11 Ibid., 52. 
12 Scheipers, ‘The Status and Protections of Prisoners of War’, 398. 
exchange cartels with their opponents, which, however, failed.13 Informal 
exchanges of prisoners did take place, though. Gerhard von Scharnhorst, for 
instance, Clausewitz’ mentor at the Institut für die jungen Offiziere der Berliner 
Inspektion (succeeded by the Allgemeine Kriegsschule in 1810) between 1801 
and 1804, and chief of staff of the Duke of Brunswick during the 1806 campaigns, 
was exchanged immediately after his capture subsequent to the Battle of 
Auerstedt.14  
 
The no-quarter decree of 1794 was by no means the only way in which 
revolutionary Paris attempted to uproot existing traditions concerning the 
treatment of prisoners in war. On 25 May 1793, the National Convention had 
prohibited the practice of impressment, which it deemed contrary to the spirit of 
the ‘nation in arms’. Of course, Napoleon’s practice of introducing conscription in 
conquered satellite states and using the armies of those states whom he had 
forced into an alliance made a mockery of these sensitivities.15 In fact, it was 
these practices that prompted Clausewitz and his fellow military reformers in 
1812 to resign their commission in the Prussian officer corps and to join – in 
Clausewitz’ case – the Russian fight against Napoleon. Clausewitz’ motives as he 
described them in his Bekenntnisdenkschrift of 1812 are very close to those that 
presented the rationale for the National Convention decree of 25 May 1793.16 
 
Moreover, on 22 June 1793 the National Convention had abolished the practice 
of release on parole. French officers were actively encouraged to break their 
parole. While the majority of French officers abided by their parole d’honneur, 
sufficient numbers of them did not. This prompted Britain to create ‘parole 
towns’ across its territory, which hosted French officers released on parole but 
now prevented from returning to France.17 These parole towns moved closer to 
the practice of detaining prisoners of war for the duration of the war, even 
though they were not yet regulated by specific laws of war.  
 
The upshot of the National Convention’s decrees on prisoners was the disruption 
of established traditions in the treatment of prisoners taken on the battlefield. 
The narrative of the ‘nation in arms’ was at odds with the traditional practices of 
prisoner exchanges, impressment and release on parole. This break with the past 
paved the way for the prisoner of war regime that would develop into the 
twentieth century, based on long-term captivity in the hands of the opponent. At 
                                                        
13 Gavin Daly, ‘Napoleon’s Lost Legions: French Prisoners of War in Britain, 
1803-1814’, History 89/3 (2004), 372.  
14 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 126. 
15 Scheipers, ‘The Status and Protections of Prisoners of War’, 399. 
16 Clausewitz, ‘Bekenntnisdenkschrift’, in Rothfels (ed.), Politische Schriften und 
Briefe, 80-119. 
17 Daly, ‘Napoleon’s Lost Legions’, 370ff. 
the same time, the break was patchy and incomplete. Clausewitz’ own experience 
of captivity illustrates this. He was detained in his role as adjutant to Prince 
August and as such shared the aristocratic privileges of captivity that the French 
granted to August. At the same time, his letters to his fiancée reflect that he was 
constantly hoping to be exchanged and thus eventually to be able to return to 
Berlin before the conclusion of a peace treaty between France and Prussia. 
However, his hopes were dashed time and again, and it was only the conclusion 
of the Tilsit Peace Treaty of 9 July 1807 that brought about August and 
Clausewitz’ release.  
 
 
Clausewitz in 1806: the young officer-scholar 
 
When he was taken captive by the French near Prenzlau, Clausewitz was 26 
years old. He had spent the majority of his lifetime in the Prussian army. Born in 
1780 in Burg near Magdeburg into a family whose aristocratic heritage was 
disputed, he had joined the Prussian army at the age of twelve.18 He had fought 
in Prussia’s Rhine campaigns of 1793 and 1794. Clausewitz had always shown a 
keenness for education, but he remained an autodidact until he entered the 
Institut für die jungen Offiziere in Berlin, from where he graduated in 1804 as top 
of the class. Throughout his student years at the Institut, its director Gerhard von 
Scharnhorst, who soon had spotted Clausewitz’ talent, acted as his mentor. It was 
Scharnhorst who recommended Clausewitz as adjutant to Prince August. This 
would prove to be fateful for the way in which Clausewitz experienced his 
captivity in France.  August, a year Clausewitz’ senior, was the youngest son of 
Prince Ferdinand of Prussia and a nephew of Frederick II. As we shall see in 
more detail in the next section, even though Clausewitz showed respect and 
loyalty to the prince, August’s personality often frustrated him.  
 
August and Clausewitz were taken captive after Prussia’s crushing defeat in the 
twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt. August’s unit had been part of General von 
Kalckreuth’s reserve corps. On 13 October, it had received orders to join 
Frederick William III’s army in Auerstedt. Arriving there on 14 October, 
Clausewitz was involved in August’s attempt to mount a counter-attack on the 
Napoleonic forces. August rated Clausewitz’ performance highly in a subsequent 
letter to Frederick William III. In spite of August’s units’ best efforts, the battle 
was lost, even though the counter-attack allowed the majority of the Prussian 
                                                        
18 In one of his letters from captivity, he wrote at length to his fiancée Marie von 
Brühl, whose family’s social status far outranked that of the Clausewitzs, about 
the anxiety his family’s disputed aristocratic heritage caused him and how he 
feared that Marie could see him as an impostor. Carl to Marie, 13 December 
1806, Karl Linnebach (ed.), Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Leben in Briefen 
und Tagebuchblättern (Berlin: Verlag Martin Warneck, 1916), 73-74. 
troops to escape.19 What followed was a 14-day tour from Auerstedt via 
Halberstadt and Neuruppin to Prenzlau, where August surrendered on 28 
October. He was allowed a short sojourn in Berlin to recover from his wounds. 
On 30 December 1806 August was sent into French captivity in Nancy, and 
Clausewitz accompanied him.  
 
His post as August’s adjutant had brought Clausewitz into contact with the 
Prussian court. This is where he first encountered Marie von Brühl, who was 
lady in waiting to Princess Charlotte. Marie’s mother initially viewed Clausewitz 
as an undesirable suitor; however, Clausewitz’ mobilization in 1806 and his 
departure from Berlin seem to have softened Mme von Brühl’s rejection. She 
allowed Marie to write to Carl and to receive his letters.  
 
In 1806, Marie and Scharnhorst were the two most important figures in 
Clausewitz’ life. Marie was connected to the court, but she was fiercely critical of 
Frederick William III’s indecision and his failure to mount a successful defensive 
campaign against Napoleon. Like the military reformers gathered around 
Scharnhorst, Marie was intensely patriotic, and believed that it was Prussia’s lack 
of political leadership and its societal decadence rather French invincibility that 
had led to Prussia’s decline. The military reform movement around Scharnhorst, 
with Clausewitz as one of its central members, was led by the conviction that 
Prussia’s ancien régime structures were no match for French expansionism 
fuelled by the lévee on masse. The reformers did not advocate following the 
example of the French Revolution. Any support that the revolution had enjoyed 
in some political quarters across Europe had largely given way to 
disenchantment after the excesses of the terror of 1793-94 and Napoleon’s coup 
of 1799. Yet the reformers could not fail to realize the vast power the French 
state had harnessed once it had mobilized the people into its war effort.  
 
At the time of his capture, Clausewitz had started writing on questions of 
strategy and military history. His earliest preserved text is an assignment 
entitled ‘Aufloesung der 26ten Aufgabe’, presenting a solution to a set tactical 
problem.20 In 1804 he had drafted a collection of brief essays on strategy.21 In 
addition, he had completed a study of the campaigns of Gustav Adolphus.22 He 
had also drafted a text in French, ‘Considération sur la manière de faire la guerre 
                                                        
19 Colson, Clausewitz, 62. 
20 Clausewitz, ‘Auflösung der 26ten Aufgabe’, Werner Hahlweg (ed.) Schriften – 
Aufsätze – Studien – Briefe Vol I (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 57-
58. 
21 Clausewitz, Strategie aus dem Jahr 1804, Eberhard Kessel (ed.) (Hamburg: 
Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1937). 
22 Carl von Clausewitz, Gustav Adolphs Feldzüge von 1630-1632, Hinterlassene 
Werke vol 9, Berlin: Dümmler, 1837). 
à la France’, a discussion of the options of forming an alliance against Napoleon 
in the interstice between the second and the third coalition.23 1805 saw his first 
publication in the Neue Bellona, a military journal widely read among German 
officers, where Clausewitz contributed a critique of the Enlightenment military 
thinker Adam Heinrich von Bülow.24 None of these texts dealt specifically with 
France or its way in war at the time. The only explicit mention of revolutionary 
France in Clausewitz’ pre-captivity writings can be found in a short and 
unpublished note, in which he compared France to the Roman Empire – a 
common comparison at the time – and opined that in contrast to Rome, which 
had granted conquered peoples a relative degree of cultural freedom, Napoleon 
insisted on assimilation.25   
 
While he was in captivity, Clausewitz drafted three ‘letters’ for publication in 
another journal, Minerva, about the campaign of 1806. In the third of these 
‘letters’, of 19 February 1807, he pondered French tactical innovations that he 
had observed at close quarters during the campaign, in particular the system of 
decentralized marches that allowed the French to travel at much greater speed 
than the Prussians.26 
 
Before, and into the early stages of captivity, Clausewitz thus had not considered 
France’s political context or its ‘national character’ in any depth. He did concede 
that Napoleon had introduced impressive tactical innovations, but he had no 
clear grasp yet of France as a political or a social entity. This was to change with 
his sojourn in France. Even though he left Berlin with a heavy heart at the end of 
December 1806, he travelled to France determined to gain knowledge and 
understanding of the enemy. Clausewitz was by no means objective in his 
perspective on France, and he would have found it unpatriotic not to be 
unashamedly partisan in his observations. France – as a nation – was the enemy 
in the wake of the revolution. Consequently, Clausewitz turned his attention to 
studying France’s national character, rather than the interest of its dynastic 
rulers. Even though the conditions of his captivity were reminiscent of old 
regime practices, Clausewitz was well aware of the politicization along national 
lines of prisoners in the wake of the French Revolution. This threw up the 
question of the German national character in comparison to the French one. 
Clausewitz’ study of the enemy coevolved with an understanding of the self. If 
                                                        
23 Clausewitz, Considération sur la manière de faire la guerre à la France’, 
Hahlweg (ed.) Schriften Vol I, 58-63. 
24 Clausewitz, Historische Briefe über die grossen Kriegsereignisse im Oktober 
1806, Joachim Niemeyer (ed.) (Bonn: Dümmler, 1977). 
25 Clausewitz, untitled note (1805), Rothfels (ed.), Politische Schriften und Briefe, 
4. 
26 Clausewitz, Historische Briefe, 55ff. 
Clausewitz likened France to Rome before 1806, he broadened this comparison 
in 1807 to one in which Prussia was assigned the role of ancient Greece.  
 
 
Clausewitz’ time in France: studying the French ‘national character’ and 
inventing the ‘German’ ‘national character’ 
 
It was first and foremost in his letters to Marie that Clausewitz recorded his 
impressions of France and his experience of captivity. They are partly written in 
the form of a travelogue. Indeed, the first batch of letters, which Carl wrote on his 
journey from Berlin to Nancy between 6 and 18 January 1807, are headed by the 
title ‘Mein Reisejournal’.27 In the last letter in this batch, which Carl penned upon 
his arrival in Nancy, he wrote to Marie that he was ‘feeling very, very sad’ and 
ended the travelogue with an apology for his dark mood.28 In addition to the 
travelogue he sent to Marie, he also wrote a private travelogue.29 
 
The travelogue had been adopted by many officers and soldiers during the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic era, precisely because the break with ancien 
régime practices meant that prisoners taken on the battlefield were more often 
detained in their opponent’s territory. Captivity was an opportunity for cultural 
exchange. At the same time, the format of the travelogue had already established 
travel literature as the preferred medium of ‘the identity construction of the 
foreign “other” and the domestic self.’30 Alexander von Humboldt had produced a 
more than 4,000 pages-long travel journal on his expedition to South America 
1799-1804, which served as the basis for his later 30 volume-strong publication 
on his journey.31 As a literary genre, the travelogue had emerged as a scientific 
medium as well as a site for cultural exchange and the nascent construction of 
political and cultural self-identity.  
 
Even though Clausewitz did not mark out the rest of his correspondence to Marie 
as a travelogue, his letters from captivity followed the characteristics of the 
genre in many respects. He shaped his first impression from Nancy into a poem 
entitled ‘German and French’ in which he traced back the differences between 
German and French national character to differences in the languages: French is 
                                                        
27 Carl to Marie, 6-18 January 1807, Linnebach (ed.), Karl und Marie, 76-81. 
28 Carl to Marie, 18 January 1807, Linnebach (ed.), Karl und Marie, 81. 
29 Carl von Clausewitz, ‘Aus dem Reisejournal von 1807’, Hans Rothfels (ed.), 
Politische Schriften und Briefe (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922), 23-35. 
30 Leighton James, ‘Travel Writings and Encounters with National “Others” in the 
Napoleonic Wars’, History Compass 7/4 (2009), 1247.  
31 Alexander von Humboldt, Le voyage aux régions equinoxiales du Nouveau 
Continent, fait en 1799–1804, par Alexandre de Humboldt et Aimé Bonpland (Paris: 
N. Maze, 1807-1837). 
a ‘melodic’ language that is ‘suitable for jokes’, whereas German is the language 
of liberty and fraternalism (used in the mythical Rütli oath that founded the Old 
Swiss confederacy). The German language echoes the sound of the swords with 
which the Old Confederacy defended itself against Habsburg encroachment.32 
The political undercurrents of the poem are clear: the Swiss spirit of resistance 
was what Germany needed.33  
 
Language would remain Clausewitz’ starting point in his observations about 
France and its society. He depicted the French language as affected and 
superficial: ‘If there has ever been a language that constrains the spirit like a 
close-fitting robe, it is French, and the French spirit in its stilted courtesy would 
be horrified by such a confession [referring to a confession of her love for Carl 
made by Marie in her previous letter, presumably] in spite of all the real hubris 
of the nation.’34 From Paris, he wrote to Marie about the peculiarities of the 
French theatre. Performances oscillated between contrived presentations and 
moments of sheer hysteria that struck Clausewitz as ‘indecorous’, even though 
the French did not seem to perceive them as such and were carried away by the 
play.35 Overall, Clausewitz described the French as arrogant and lacking moral 
depth. In his later reflections written from Coppet in Switzerland, where he had 
to sojourn with August after their release from French captivity, he also added 
the charge that the French lacked originality and individualism – traits that for 
Clausewitz were also rooted in their language.36 
 
This characterization seems to sit uneasily with the revolutionary upheaval that 
France had undergone since 1789 – the ‘real hubris of the nation’, as Clausewitz 
referred to it. About Nancy, he complained that he was forced into ‘polite 
                                                        
32 Carl to Marie, undated letter (between 18 and 23 January 1807), Linnebach 
(ed.), Karl und Marie von Clausewitz, 81. 
33 Clausewitz would reinvoke the example of the Swiss in his 1809 letter to 
Fichte; Clausewitz, ‘Ein ungenannter Militär an Fichte, als Verfasser des 
Aufsatzes über Machiavelli im ersten Bande der “Vesta”’, in Walther Malmsten 
Schering, Geist und Tat: Das Vermächtnis des Soldaten und Denkers (Remscheid: 
Deutscher Militärverlag, 1988), 68-74. 
34 Carl to Marie, 28 February 1807, Linnebach (ed.), Karl und Marie, 89. 
35 Carl to Marie, 29 March 1807, Linnebach (ed.), Karl und Marie, 101. 
36 Carl to Marie, 29 March 1807, Linnebach (ed.) Karl und Marie, 101. Clausewitz 
had most likely picked up the basics of the French language at his local school in 
Burg, which had adopted the curriculum of Hecker’s Realschule, including French 
language tuition, in 1788. Cf. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, 18; Colson, 
Clausewitz, 20.  He had drafted his first brief text in French in 1805 (see footnote 
16 above). In his correspondence with Marie, he reflected upon French 
expressions and figures of speech. In June 1807, he reported to Marie that he had 
read the novel Corinne ou l’Italie in French.  
company’ every day – ‘ein wahres Courvisitenleben’  (like visiting a Spa town), 
which did not at all suit his character and which he regarded as inappropriate for 
the situation he and August found themselves in.37 Paris appeared only mildly 
more revolutionary to Clausewitz than rural Lorraine. Upon receiving the news 
that he and August had been invited to stay in Paris rather than remain in Nancy, 
he wrote to Marie that he abhorred the prospect of being ‘violently dragged into 
the extreme brightness of bourgeois life’.38 
 
In the end, the French decided to accommodate Prince August and Clausewitz in 
Soissons, a small town to the North-East of Paris. Upon their arrival, Carl 
complained to Marie that he had had to devote his first three days in the town 
exclusively to ‘meeting new people; because there is no old lady in the arguably 
tiny Soissons, who would not be dragged out to see whether it would be possible 
[for us] to help her kill some precious time for one evening, which is called “to 
amuse oneself”. By the way, these grannies are so abundant in Soissons that one 
could be let to believe that it is France’s old folk’s home’.39 What Carl described is 
not an encounter with a bellicose Leviathan that has unleashed the revolutionary 
spirits of the nation. On the contrary, it is a society constrained and held back by 
the shackles of its superficial, formal and stilted national character, if not 
completely geriatric on top.  
 
In addition to being annoyed and offended by the French national character, 
Clausewitz grew increasingly exasperated about his travel companion August. In 
Clausewitz’ eyes the prince was part of a thoroughly Frenchified cosmopolitan 
elite, who, owing to his cosmopolitan outlook, did not grasp the gravitas of being 
held in enemy hands. He socialized incessantly, thereby forcing Clausewitz to 
spend endless time in ‘polite company’, for which he was temperamentally 
unsuited and which he regarded with a thinly veiled disdain, not least because of 
August’s penchant for fraternizing with the enemy. On their visits to Paris, 
August turned into a sightseeing maniac. Clausewitz was not opposed to making 
use of the opportunity to see galleries and architecture – on 8 April 1807 he 
wrote to Marie that he ‘had been in the picture gallery quite frequently’.40 
However, August went about the cultural discovery of Paris in a way that 
offended Clausewitz’ deeper and more sensitive (read: German) soul. On 29 
March 1807 he wrote to Marie from Paris: ‘We have been here for eleven days 
now and walk as much as our physical resources allow us, to see all, all, all the 
sights that can be found here; regardless of whether we have already consumed 
all moral energy and have lost all sensitivity. As far as I am concerned, 
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sightseeing no longer appeals to me. How should it be possible to grasp such a 
large amount of impressions and to absorb them into our innermost being in 
such a short time; one [impression] just simply supplants the next.’41 
 
While Clausewitz was struck by the differences between the German and the 
French national characters, August seemed to fit into French society all too well: 
‘Prince August, who was raised on the pap (‘Kinderbrei’) of French literature, 
talks about it like a final year student in his exam, and there is not one book 
ranging from the tragedies to the immortal shenanigans of the genial Boufflers 
where he would not know what place it holds in the literary canon, according to 
the established opinion, of course.’ Carl confessed to Marie that these 
conversations embarrassed him, ‘because I hardly know who Corneille, Racine 
and Voltaire were’. His preferred course of action in these moments was to keep 
silent. However, he went on to explain, ‘At times this nonsense becomes too 
much for me, and my pride refuses to countenance the impression of superiority 
that my patient silence had brought about; in those moments a dispute ensues 
that would seem rather silly to a true student of aesthetics; on the one side 
nothing but learned ideas […], on the other nothing but obscure feelings and 
intuitions of truth.’42 In Clausewitz’ eyes, August was just as superficial and 
unoriginal as the French, and that was precisely because he had been raised in 
their culture at the Prussian court. 
 
Clausewitz’ letters from Paris were impressionistic and unsystematic in their 
reflection on the French national character (and its supposed diametrical 
opposite, the German national character). His analytical spirit took over during 
his stay with Mme de Staël at her château Coppet near Geneva. Here he and 
August had to await the issue of their travel documents after their release from 
French captivity in August 1807. On their way to Coppet, Clausewitz began 
writing another travelogue, on which more below.  
 
Even though Clausewitz was distraught about the crushing conditions that 
Napoleon had imposed on Prussia in the Tilsit peace treaty, his spirits seemed to 
be lifted by the fact that August and he were now in ‘German’ rather than in 
French company. Germaine the Staël was a Franco-Swiss socialite who was a 
vocal critic of Napoleon and an admirer of Germany, as Clausewitz highlighted in 
a letter to Marie: ‘It is impossible to be a greater admirer of German literature 
and German women than Mme de Staël. […] I talked to her about the magnificent 
peculiarity of our language and that it allowed even the mediocre person to be 
original owing to its wealth and freedom, whereas in the French language one 
                                                        
41 Carl to Marie, 29 March 1807, Linnebach, Karl und Marie, 99. 
42 Carl to Marie, 16 March 1807, Linnebach, Karl und Marie, 94-5, emphasis in 
original. 
finds all these prefabricated thoughts and thus one always has to use forms that 
were coined by others.’ Staël constantly discussed questions of literature and 
culture, but not in the way that Clausewitz perceived as the French national 
character. In a thinly veiled swipe at August, he remarked to Marie that ‘learned 
flowery phrases don’t impress her’.43 (August continued to embarrass Clausewitz 
in Coppet by starting an ill-conceived affair with Mme Recamier, one of Staël’s 
house guest, ‘a common coquette’, in Clausewitz’ words. This seems to have led 
August to pursue the issue of the long-awaited travel documents in a much less 
urgent manner than Clausewitz would have wished.)44 
 
In Coppet, Clausewitz also encountered the German Romantic literary critic 
Wilhelm August Schlegel, who served as tutor for Staël’s sons. Schlegel was the 
one-time hub of the Romantic circle in Jena, which had included in its informal 
membership Wilhelm August’s brother Friedrich Schlegel, Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Novalis (aka Friedrich von Hardenberg), the 
philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and the philosophy prodigy Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (the latter married Schlegel’s wife Caroline after she 
had divorced Wilhelm August Schlegel). Clausewitz warmed immediately to 
Schlegel’s character and company: ‘Above all, I was delighted to make Schlegel’s 
acquaintance. He is a brave, good-natured, patriotic German, who possesses a 
well-conditioned hate towards the French and has generally the most genuine 
German features, so that a person like myself is incapable of not loving him. […] 
He is my sole consolation.’45 Wilhelm August Schlegel’s brother Friedrich had 
once remarked that ‘it is incredible how generous nature is in France; it has 
made 30 million copies of one single individual’, as Mme de Staël reported to 
Clausewitz.46 This quip seemed to have amused him and to have summed up the 
misgivings about the French national character that he had relayed to Marie so 
far.  
 
The travelogue that Clausewitz started in Chamonix on his way to Coppet is more 
systematic than the first travelogue that he had sent to Marie. One entry from 25 
August 1807 written in Coppet offers a particularly structured discussion of 
Clausewitz’ impression of France. According to Clausewitz, France’s military 
might was not a result of an upsurge of patriotic and revolutionary passion 
among the French people. France was gripped by a ‘military despotism’, which 
looked impressive in its sheer manpower, but could not fully disguise the fact 
that its society was in decay: ‘Just as little as the revolution with all its attributes 
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has ennobled the nation, the contemporary military despotism can achieve that. 
This would be a truly new phenomenon. The army has been hardened by the 
long war and the military spirit of this government, and a string of fortunate 
campaigns have infused it with the confidence of victory. This is the cause of this 
appearance, which dazzles the masses, and behind which a semi paralyzed 
France hides itself’.47 Here Clausewitz explicitly contradicted his mentor 
Scharnhorst, who had written in 1799 that it was both the French national 
character and France’s continuing military mobilization that underpinned its 
expansion across Europe: ‘The culture of the spirit, which distinguishes this 
nation [the French] from others, and, even more importantly, continuous war 
fighting has pushed their art of war to a greater degree of perfection than that of 
other nations, at least as far as its implementation is concerned, if not its 
principles.’48 
 
Clausewitz made no secret of the fact that he ‘hated’ the French. But after he had 
had first hand experience of their society and their political system, he did not 
fear them as much: ‘Both in France and in Germany there is a widespread 
opinion that the French nation had acquired, through the revolution with its 
enthusiasm and its terror, through [France’s] victories, finally through the 
subsequent despotism, such a momentum, such a military tendency, that it 
would be impossible to resist such a nation. This opinion is erroneous.’49 
According to Clausewitz, the revolution had not transformed French society: ‘He 
who had studied Machiavelli attentively would have predicted the outcome of 
the revolution. A corrupted people is not capable of freedom, this remarkable 
man said. Such was the nature of the political enthusiasm, and such did it show 
itself in war. How can one neatly prove the existence of a pitched enthusiasm for 
the fatherland, of an invincible heroism, from the revolutionary wars?’50 He 
concluded: ‘It is not at all in the nature of things, much less grounded in the 
wealth of historical evidence, that a nation could elevate itself/rise (sich 
erheben) within a few years. This is as likely as the sudden cooling of the 
atmosphere, which the trivial weather-prophets claim to have noticed for some 
years.’51 
 
In an essay that Clausewitz finalized in November 1807, after his return to 
Berlin, he further systematized his thoughts about the differences in ‘national 
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character’ between these two nations.52 When Clausewitz wrote of the two 
nations and their respective national characters, in his travelogue and, most 
prominently, in the essay, entitled ‘The Germans and the French’, he increasingly 
pitted the ‘Germans’  - as opposed to Prussia – against the French. Some have 
interpreted this as an indication that for Clausewitz ‘the political subject shifted 
from the Prussian state to the German nation’.53 However, as we shall see, the 
German ‘national character’ – its individualism – was the precise reason for 
Germany’s decentralized and disunited political character, and hence, to a 
certain degree, for its political weakness. 
 
‘The Germans and the French’ opens with an analytical account of the French 
Revolution. The French, being superficially ‘clever’ but lacking moral depth, had 
been contented for as long as their rulers delivered the basic essentials of 
‘national fortune’: ‘national honour, personal dignity and the splendour of the 
court’. Once these attributes were lost under successive generations of Bourbon 
kings, they rose up. However, the revolution was only a blip; and the ascent of 
Napoleon Bonaparte showed that the French had lost nothing of their penchant 
for extravagant and vainglorious leaders: ‘We now realize very clearly that, as 
much as [the French] embraced the external forms of liberty during the 
revolution, little did they grasp the essence of republicanism. Bonaparte, who is 
only concerned with France’s fortune as far as it is compatible with his 
imperiousness, but who, at the same time, has satisfied vanity and superficial 
reasoning through his victories and through his newspapers, finds faithful 
subjects in the French once again.’54 
 
Clausewitz repeated many of the dichotomous observations that he had already 
included in his letters and his travelogue in ‘The Germans and the French’. The 
French were polite to the point of being stifled by rigid customs, but this 
politeness was a thin veneer that hardly covered up their cruelty, their emotional 
imbalance, their vanity, but also their lack of ambition.55 The lack of ambition 
turned the French into pliable subjects, while their easily aroused passions made 
them ‘an excellent political instrument’.56 The Germans, in contrast, were more 
profound and more individualistic; they were ‘cordial, faithful and honest’.57 The 
‘spirit of critique’ was at home in Germany, which allowed the Germans to make 
well-reflected decisions. This is why the Germans – not the French! – were 
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ideally suited to a system of  a republic. Clausewitz even opined that the creation 
of a republic could produce an increase in national identification with Germany, 
so that the unification of Germany as a state would produce Germany as a nation. 
However, two factors stood in the way of this development: Germany’s exposed 
geopolitical position in Europe, with major powers on either side, and the need 
for political unity at all times, and the innate German individualism, which meant 
that there was no pan-German political trust and loyalty.58 
 
‘The Germans and the French’ culminates in the equation of France with the 
Roman empire and Germany with ancient Greece: ‘It is precisely this 
preponderance of the French over the Germans in terms of the practical 
conditions of political life, which Rome seemed to enjoy over the Greeks, just as it 
cannot be denied that the Greeks possessed a richer and more beautiful 
individuality, which is equivalent to the German superiority over the French. […] 
The Greeks had reached the peak of cultural development earlier than the 
Romans, who never matched them in any peaceful art. They were certainly 
always superior to the Romans in terms of the richness of their intellect.’59 Like 
Rome, Napoleonic France was an empire, while ancient Greece – like Germany – 
was split into different polities. Even if Rome had lasted 500 years, it was never 
able to supersede the cultural heights that ancient Greece had reached. The 
implications were clear: military victory was not equivalent to cultural victory, 
and empires were doomed to failure. If Clausewitz had started his musings about 
the French with the observation that, unlike Rome, France tried to assert its 
cultural preponderance over the rest of Europe, he ended them with the 
conclusion that its cultural prowess was vain, hollow, and ultimately 
unsustainable. Like Rome, France could dominate Europe for a long time, but it 
was always already a power in cultural decline.  
 
 
Evaluation 
 
One thing Clausewitz was sure of at the end of his captivity in France and his stay 
at Coppet: he had to leave his post as Prince August’s adjutant. On 15 September 
1807, he wrote to Marie from Coppet asking her to pass on a letter to 
Scharnhorst, in which he requested his help to achieve a change in his position.60  
 
However, Clausewitz’ experience of 1807 was meaningful beyond his conclusion 
that he needed a career change. First, it is important to place his experience 
against the backdrop of change and continuity. Clausewitz and his 
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contemporaries had witnessed dramatic changes in Europe between 1793 and 
1806, with 1806 seemingly sealing Prussia’s downfall. And yet, Clausewitz 
highlighted instances of continuity in his letters and his travelogues rather than 
manifestations of change: the conditions of his captivity resembled old regime 
practices more than anything groundbreakingly new. France itself seemed to be 
sleepy and paralysed by stilted traditions. Prince August represented Frenchified 
aristocratic decadence. While Clausewitz could not wait to return to Prussia and 
contribute to its revival, August vainly chased romantic adventures and was 
apparently in no rush to return to the Prussian court.  
 
This led Clausewitz to invert the roles of France and Germany. The France that 
he had encountered was a backward place, Clausewitz argued. Like Rome, it may 
have acquired great administrative and military power, but it was already an 
empire in decline. No cultural or spiritual renewal could be expected to emerge 
from France. Germany, however, as a cultural nation, even though it was 
politically split into a myriad of different states and principalities, held the 
source of a true spiritual revival, the benchmark of which was ancient Greece. 
Germany was the forward-looking nation, the one whose cultural weight would 
endure and at some point supersede the predominance of France, just like Rome 
could not eclipse ancient Greek culture. Germany’s role was essentially tragic – 
and this was no accident, given that German philhellenism around 1800 had 
resulted in a heightened interest in the Greek tragedy: its very best features – the 
individualism of its people and their critical spirit – prevented it from unifying 
and from becoming a political heavyweight in Europe.  
 
From a contemporary perspective, it is hard to relate to Clausewitz’ outspoken 
patriotism and explicit hatred of the French. This chimes with a Clausewitz 
interpretation that became dominant in the 1970s, which emphasized the 
‘rational’ side of Clausewitz’ view of war as an instrument of policy.61 Yet when 
Clausewitz later, in his famous trinity in chapter 1 of book I of On War, described 
‘hatred and enmity’ as the ‘essential violence of its element’, we have to assume 
that he partly drew upon personal experience.62 At the same time, the 
nationalization of war had thrown up the question of political identities, and, to a 
large extent, Clausewitz was reacting to questions that he had to confront as a 
result of the nationalization of war. 
 
Clausewitz followed the established literary genre of the travelogue and used it 
as a springboard to ‘discover’ the character of a foreign nation and to construct 
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the national identity of the self – Germany – at the same time. This was an 
established feature of the genre, which Clausewitz followed intuitively in his 
letters from France. During his stay at Coppet, the construction and juxtaposition 
of the French and German national characters became more systematic. This was 
no coincidence given that his main company at Coppet were August Wilhelm 
Schlegel and the hostess Mme de Staël. Both had been exposed to the nascent 
historicism of Johann Gottfried Herder. In his early oeuvre, Fragmente über die 
neuere deutsche Literatur (Fragments on Recent German Literature, 1776/77), 
Herder had written ‘Each nation speaks according to how it thinks, and thinks 
according to how it speaks.’63 Herder was an early critic of the Enlightenment 
assumption according to which the human condition was universal rather than 
divided into different cultures or nations. In his 1785 publication Ideen zu einer 
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of 
Mankind), Herder insisted ‘that the ideal constitution is individual, reflecting the 
character and the way of life of a people’.64 
 
August Wilhelm Schlegel knew Herder personally. Herder had lived in Weimar 
between 1776 and his death in 1803, and had been part of the wider Romantic 
Jena/Weimar network with Schlegel at its centre. Incidentally, it had been 
Herder who, in his role as superintendent of the Lutheran church, had to grant 
Schlegel’s formal divorce from Caroline Böhmer-Schlegel. Schlegel’s appraisal of 
German literature in the European context reflects the impact of a Herderian 
historical anthropology.65 
 
When Clausewitz met Staël in 1807, she was already a well-established writer. 
Clausewitz had read her Corinne ou l’Italie during his time in France, as he 
reported to Marie.66 Corinne took up the difference in Nordic and Southern 
European mentalities, which again points towards Herder’s historical 
anthropology. In 1807, Staël started writing De l’Allemagne, the intention of 
which was ‘to point out what France did not have, but might have, if it let another 
nation be its guide and its inspiration’ – the other nation of course being 
Germany.67 The inversion that Clausewitz undertook by ‘unmasking’ France as a 
backward nation and identifying Germany as the beacon of cultural achievement 
was hence a well established cultural trope in anti-Napoleonic circles.  
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 Both Schlegel and Staël had an ultimately cosmopolitan understanding of 
national cultures. Schlegel believed that the German language was an ideal 
medium for cultural transfers across Europe because it was an excellent 
translation language.68 Staël advocated a cultural transfer from Germany 
towards France, in order to save that latter from decay. Both were convinced 
that a revival of German culture and literature could strengthen and reinvigorate 
European culture writ large.  
 
Clausewitz shared this cosmopolitanism in a certain sense, though not in its 
political implications. For him, Prussia’s – and Germany’s – resurrection had to 
be achieved by rolling back the cultural influence that France had had on Europe 
for centuries. National identity was not necessarily bound to ethnicity, but it did 
intersect with one’s place in the social order. Prussia’s problem was that its court 
had been thoroughly Frenchified and had therefore succumbed to the same 
degree of decadence that had characterized the French nation in its entirety. 
With this move, Clausewitz introduced a further twist in the co-evolving 
construction of the identity of the ‘other’ and the ‘self’: the identification of the 
‘other’ inside the ‘self’. If Schlegel and Staël thought that Europe had to become 
more German in order to save itself from France, Clausewitz’ conclusion was that 
first of all, the Prussian court had to become less French in order to enable 
Prussia to resurrect itself. Clausewitz’ challenge to the Prussian king in 1812, 
when he left the Prussian army to fight with Russia against Napoleon, thus had 
roots that reached far beyond the whim of the moment. 
 
Even though Clausewitz’ letters to Marie from France and from Switzerland 
contain his repeated lament about Prussia’s hopeless situation, the general trend 
was that the more Clausewitz got to know France, the less he feared it as an 
opponent. He was distraught upon receiving the news of the Tilsit peace treaty 
and relayed to Marie that he anticipated the worst – ‘the French army keeping 
the Prussian provinces under occupation’.69 But the impression of French 
invincibility had vanished. Confronted in part by his status as prisoner of war 
with the question of political identity and unable to devote any efforts to the 
practical liberation of Prussia, he increasingly clung on to the comparative 
analysis of the French and the German national characters. The equation of this 
confrontation with the juxtaposition of Rome and Greece provided further solace 
to Clausewitz. Here he followed again common tropes put forward by Romantic 
and humanist circles in Germany. The historian Johann Joachim Winckelmann in 
his seminal History of Ancient Art (1764) had introduced the idea that the Roman 
empire was not at the zenith of antiquity, rather, it signified antiquity’s late 
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decaying stages. At the heart of ancient Greece’s culture had been freedom, and 
that was what had made Greek art superior to anything Rome had achieved, 
because the latter suppressed freedom.70 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who started 
giving his addresses to the German nation beginning in December 1807, just a 
few weeks after Clausewitz had edited ‘The Germans and the French’, followed 
the path that Winckelmann had established and that Clausewitz had followed as 
well.’71 
 
While for Fichte, it followed that Germany had to resist as a nation, Clausewitz 
never drew this political conclusion. Upon his return to Berlin, he immersed 
himself in the practical efforts among his fellow military reformers in order to 
strive for Prussia’s liberation. For Clausewitz, institutions such as the Prussian 
Landwehr ultimately counted more than the lofty promise of cultural transfer or 
the cold comfort that, even though Prussia and the rest of Germany had been 
subdued by Napoleon, German culture would live on after France had met its 
inevitable downfall. However, in Clausewitz’s strategic thought, the idea of 
nationalism as a spark to popular resistance took hold, even though, after 1807, 
Clausewitz regarded resistance against Napoleon and the unification of Germany 
as two separate – and not equally desirable – projects. His desperate and 
sometimes embittered search for ways to curb Napoleon’s expansion across 
Europe led him to embrace the promise of people’s war in his writings from the 
reform years, which, in turn, deeply influenced his view that defence was the 
stronger form of war in his mature writings, in particular On War.72 The change 
in tone on the advantages of the defence is palpable in one of Clausewitz’s first 
texts after his return from captivity, entitled ‘Ueber die künftigen Kriegs-
Operationen Preußens gegen Frankreich’ (On Prussia’s future military 
operations against France’). In many ways, the text echoed the concerns of the 
Considérations of 1805, only this time pondering the options of a collaboration of 
European powers after the end of the war of the fourth coalition. However, a new 
element emerged: ‘My idea is to sacrifice a state that one is no longer able to 
defend in order to save its army.’ Such an army would no longer be a defending 
army, as there was, strictly speaking, nothing left to defend, but, because of its 
continued existence and offensive threat, it would tie down sizable proportions 
of the enemy’s forces: ‘ However, this defence [defence against the persisting 
army of a defeated state] is not defence proper; rather, it is something much 
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more difficult, namely, guarding the offensive army.’73 Clausewitz still had some 
intellectual terrain to cover before he was able to express the dynamic that made 
defence the stronger form of war, but the roots laid there.74  
 
After 1807, Clausewitz met pan-German efforts at liberation either with 
indifference or with reservations: the break up of the Confederation of the Rhine 
in November 1813 and its members’ subsequent joining of the sixth coalition did 
not warrant a mention in Carl’s letters to Marie, while he later blamed the 
Lützow free corps, a pan-German unit formed in 1813, for inspiring the 
nationalist Wartburg movement, which Clausewitz held responsible for the 
political ‘agitations’ that shook Prussia and other German territories from 1817 
to 1819.75 Finally, his reaction to the Polish question reflected that, for 
Clausewitz, liberation and people’s war demanded certain qualities and a certain 
stage in the evolution of a nation: in On War, he attributed the partitions of 
Poland to the fact that its leaders were not willing to evolve Poland from a ‘tartar 
state’ into a European one, and to amalgamate its people.76 Clausewitz did not 
support the Polish November uprising of 1830-31 and denounced it as the 
brainchild of cosmopolitan ideologues rather than the expression of the passion 
of a nation. 77 
 
Conclusion 
 
The France that Clausewitz encountered in captivity struck him as just as 
traditional, even backward, as the conditions of his captivity. The revolution had 
not taken hold in French society; it had been a short-lived upheaval that had 
arguably increased the power of the French state, but had not changed the 
mindset and the culture of the French people. Republicanism was ill-suited to the 
French national character. The French were trapped in stilted societal customs. 
They were vain, yet they lacked ambition. They were superficially polite and 
refined, but their fickle nature lent itself to sudden irrational outbursts of 
passion. Here Clausewitz followed directly in Herder’s footsteps, who had argued 
that every people ought to have a constitution and a government that suited 
their own national character.  
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Clausewitz would later change his mind regarding the lasting impact of the 
nationalization of war that the French Revolution had provoked. In book VIII of 
On War, he observed that Napoleon had perfected France as a ‘military power 
grounded in the power of the people in its entirety’. He went on to speculate on 
whether people’s war was to become the predominant way of war in the future, 
or whether cabinet wars would become the norm again. He left this question 
open, but warned contemporaries that the sheer possibility of people’s war had 
changed strategic thinking and planning for good.78 The historical event that may 
have changed Clausewitz’ mind was the war on the Iberian peninsula, which 
made him realise that the nationalization of war triggered popular insurrections 
in occupied territory. The revolution may have kicked off a discourse of 
nationalization, but with France’s expansion across Europe, the revolution had 
lost the monopoly over the nationalization of war. Irregular forces fighting 
against Napoleon had finished what the revolution had started, but was not able 
to complete. 
 
It is not hard to see that Clausewitz’ ‘description’ of the French national 
character is actually a construction. It developed in lockstep with the 
construction of a ‘German’ self-identity, in which each mostly negative attribute 
of the French national character was matched with a mostly positive feature of 
the German national character. Psychologically, it is easy to understand where 
Clausewitz was coming from: after the experience of a crushing defeat, he took 
solace in a pronounced patriotism and clung on to indications that Prussia could 
ultimately liberate itself from French domination.79 
 
Yet, if we stop at this psychological interpretation, we miss important insights 
into the way in which captivity was a consequential experience for Clausewitz. 
He started to record his observations in an unsystematic fashion in his letters to 
Marie and in his travelogues. Initially, the genre of the travelogue provided the 
form for his observations. Clausewitz followed the established tropes of the 
genre by presenting his captivity as a ‘discovery’ of the foreign other and the 
narration of the identity of the self. During his stay at Coppet, his thoughts on 
France and Germany became much more systematic. His letters to Marie suggest 
that he spent a large amount of his time in Coppet in debates with August 
Wilhelm Schlegel and Mme de Staël, both of whom had made a career out of 
speculating on the differences between the German and the French national 
characters. While Clausewitz did not agree with Schlegel and Staël’s 
cosmopolitanism, they did provide him with more systematic arguments and 
interpretations, which he eagerly used to make sense of his observations. He 
took up central elements of the anti-Napoleonic Romantic and humanist 
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discourse, such as the idea that the French Revolution had shown the 
undesirability of political revolutions and that only Germany could be the source 
of a proper spiritual renewal. He also harkened back to the equation of France 
with Rome and Germany with Greece that had been inspired by the work of 
Winckelmann.  
 
Ultimately, what this interpretative framework suggested to Clausewitz was that 
Prussia was not entirely lost yet. The narrative of the German national character 
convinced Clausewitz that the liberation of Prussia was possible. This gave a 
great impetus to the work he took up as a military reformer upon his return to 
Paris. The textual link that indicates this can be found in Clausewitz’ 1812 
Bekenntnisdenkschrift – one of the core texts of the Prussian military reform 
movement. In the third ‘confession’, Clausewitz integrated a lengthy section that 
revisited the differences in the French and German national characters, with the 
ultimate aim to show that a people’s war against French occupation was 
possible.80   
 
At the same time, Clausewitz’ interest in the German nation as a potential 
political subject waned after his return to Berlin. Even in his writings from 
captivity, he had never been fully convinced that the German nation could resist 
France – precisely because it was a central part of the German national character 
that it was individualistic, giving rise to political fragmentation. After 1807, 
Greece ceased to be Clausewitz’ historical reference point on which he could pin 
his hopes for liberation. In his 1809 letter to Fichte, Clausewitz returned to the 
ideal of the Swiss confederation as a reference point for the aspiration of 
liberation.81 Ultimately, in the young Clausewitz’ mind, war was what produced a 
new political subject, not culture or national character, even though they played 
a role in allowing a nation to rise up against foreign occupation. The confession 
memorandum and the plans that Clausewitz developed regarding a Landwehr 
and a Landsturm were geared to Prussia, not Germany.  
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